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INTRODUCTION
Something is missing from Title VII-a modern and fully functional
theory of direct employer liability for individual discrimination claims.
Courts largely focus on finding employers indirectly liable for discrimina-
tion through the acts of their agents, rather than viewing the employer as
* Assistant Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law. I would like to thank
Ann McGinley, Jeremi Duru, Jarod Gonzalez, Melissa Hart, and Craig Green for their thoughtful
comments on drafts of this Article and Lauren Moser for her research assistance.
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the culpable actor in appropriate circumstances.' This Article posits that
five major problems with Title VII can be eliminated or reduced by once
again recognizing the importance of direct employer liability and by re-
theorizing direct liability using modern conceptions of corporate character.
In the first decade after Title VII's enactment, two types of claims
dominated enforcement efforts: individual disparate treatment claims, in-
volving company policies that overtly discriminated on the basis of a pro-
tected trait, and (to a lesser extent) disparate impact cases, involving fa-
cially neutral company policies that resulted in discrimination.2 Courts
considering these cases held employers directly liable for their policies.3
However, in the 1970s, the landscape changed. Plaintiffs began using,
as the primary basis for Title VII liability, individual disparate treatment
claims that did not rely on a facially discriminatory company policy.4 This
change then led to a theoretical shift in the basis for holding companies
liable for discrimination. As this new type of discrimination claim gained
favor, and especially with the advent of harassment and sexual proposi-
tioning claims, indirect liability became the primary mode used to impress
liability on companies in individual disparate treatment cases.
This focus on indirect liability forgets that there are two types of lia-
bility within Title VII's definition of employer: the liability that the entity
itself possesses and the entity's indirect liability for the actions of its
agents. Relying primarily on indirect liability causes, contributes to, or
amplifies five major problems within the employment discrimination field:
conceptualizations of discrimination that rely on the rogue actor, oversim-
plification of workplace decisionmaking, overreliance on the stray remarks
doctrine, a current inability or unwillingness to incorporate unconscious or
structural discrimination theories into workable liability structures, and the
false division of employment discrimination claims into fixed categories.
Because of these problems, employment discrimination law has been una-
ble to fully capture the realities of the modern workplace and fully effec-
tuate Title VII's antidiscrimination mandates.
1. This Article uses the term "indirect liability," rather than terms such as vicarious liability and
respondeat superior. This choice was made because the Supreme Court's enunciation of these latter
principles in the Title VII context often differs from common law enunciations, and the Author did not
want to invite confusion. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802 n.3 (1998)
(describing that agency analysis under Title VII is not bound by agency principles in other contexts);
see also Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies: Vicarious Liability
Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 755, 760-61 (1999) (de-
scribing differences in agency analysis). The term "indirect liability" is meant to refer to a situation in
which the employer is found liable primarily through the intent of its agents.
2. See infra Part LB. (discussing historical development of agency issues within Title VII).
3. See infra Part IL.B.
4. See infra Part LB.
5. See infra Parts LB-C.
774 [Vol. 61:4:773
A Modern Theory of Direct Corporate Liability
Borrowing the emerging concept of corporate character from criminal
law and corporate law scholarship, this Article attempts to demonstrate
how employment discrimination law can benefit from a fuller conception
of direct liability. Undergirded by a realist view of the corporation, the
concept of corporate character posits that the corporation has a life and
intent of its own, separate from the individual actions of its agents.6 This
Article combines current scholarship regarding corporate intent in the cor-
porate and criminal contexts with a fair interpretation of Title VII's text,
case law, and theoretical underpinnings to demonstrate that direct corpo-
rate liability-as retheorized in this Article-can be a viable, and power-
ful, tool in employment discrimination cases.
In Part I, this Article provides the first, comprehensive historical ac-
count of agency developments under Title VII, which helps to explain the
statute's present overreliance on indirect liability. Part II continues by
reviewing the employment discrimination literature to outline the major
difficulties caused by overreliance on derivative liability. Part III outlines
the corporate character doctrine being developed outside the employment
discrimination context. Part IV demonstrates how this concept can be im-
ported into the Title VII context, consistent with Title VII's statutory text
and case law.
I. EXAMINING TITLE VII'S STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT
This Part explores the statutory framework and case law that is fun-
damental to understanding Title VII's current overreliance on holding the
6. See, e.g., Eric Colvin, Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability, 6 CRIM. L.F. 1, 2
(1995) ("Corporations can act and be at fault in ways that are different from the ways in which their
members can act and be at fault."); see also Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 833, 851-52 (2000) (discussing ways in which corporate
identities are separate from those of company's agents); Michael B. Metzger & Dan R. Dalton, Seeing
the Elephant: An Organizational Perspective on Corporate Moral Agency, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 489,
510-27, 555 (1996) ("Thus, while it is indeed accurate to describe a corporation as a legal fiction, an
aggregate, and a nexus-of-contracts because each of these descriptions captures some aspect of the
beast, it is also necessary to say that corporations are not just fictions, aggregates, or contractual nexi.
They are also real entities that produce real behavior that is fully explainable by none of the other
theories and that has a real impact on the quality of the lives that all of us lead. It is, of course, true
that organizations would not exist without individuals, but it is also equally true that phenomena such
as risky shift and groupthink would not exist without organizations.") (citations omitted); Metzger &
Dalton, supra, at 555 ("Organizations are sociological systems that shape their members and their
members' behavior.") (citations omitted); Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 34 ARIz. L. REv. 743, 767-80 (1992) (describing corporate character con-
cept). See generally Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1095 (1991) (proposing a corporate ethos doctrine based on the idea of
separate corporate intent); Moore, supra, at 762 (applying a corporate character model). Various
advocates of the corporate character doctrine have articulated slightly different iterations of the doc-
trine. See Moore, supra, at 768 & n.124.
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employer liable primarily through the intent of its agents. It also provides
a historical account of how agency principles developed under Title VII.
A. The Statutory Framework
Both the discrimination and retaliation provisions of Title VII begin
with the same introductory words: "It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . . . ."' The term "employer" is defined, in part,
as follows: "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of
such a person .... " The statutory text itself provides little direction re-
garding the meaning of the term "employer." An examination of the his-
torical development of the term through case law becomes necessary and
helps to explain how the courts began to view most individual disparate
treatment claims through the lens of indirect liability.
B. Historical Development
In trying to articulate how corporate liability should be assessed, it is
important to understand how current agency principles under Title VII
developed. The earliest plaintiffs seeking relief under Title VII brought
claims asserting that the employer (or union) had either a specific policy
or practice that facially discriminated based on a protected class or a fa-
cially neutral policy that resulted in a disparate impact based on a pro-
tected class.9 For example, one of the first reported federal cases in the
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a) (2006) (emphasis added). Portions of Title VII also
apply to labor organizations and employment agencies. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The liability of
these two types of entities is not relevant to the instant discussion and will not be discussed further.
When the Article mentions liability under Title VII, it is referring to the employer's liability.
8. The term "employer" is defined, in full, under Title VII as follows:
[A] person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees
for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, and any agent of such a person, but such term does not include (1) the Unit-
ed States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an Indian
tribe, or any department or agency of the District of Columbia subject by statute to proce-
dures of the competitive service (as defined in section 2102 of Title 5), or (2) a bona fide
private membership club (other than a labor organization) which is exempt from taxation
under section 501(c) of Title 26, except that during the first year after March 24, 1972,
persons having fewer than twenty-five employees (and their agents) shall not be considered
employers.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006).
9. While it would not be fruitful to provide citation to every Title VII case decided during this
period, the following citations describe the types of claims being brought in the 1960s. See, e.g.,
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 244-45 (M.D.N.C. 1968) (addressing whether educa-
tional requirements were discriminatory); Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 368, 374 (E.D. La.
1968) (alleging that employer engaged in discrimination by only hiring union members, when union
itself engaged in discriminatory membership practices); Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 277 F.
Supp. 117, 117-18 (S.D. Ga. 1967) (alleging that employer had a policy of making gender a qualifica-
776
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Westlaw database invoking Title VII for actions taken after the statute's
effective date involved claims that a company maintained a race-
segregated job classification structure and had a policy of providing certain
jobs, training opportunities, wage increases, and transfers only to white
employees. 0
In these early cases, allegations of discrimination by individual actors
remained ancillary to the larger claims against the company, if they were
made at all." Very few of these early cases specifically allege discrimina-
tion being taken by a specific agent of the company, and even when such
allegations are present, it is not clear whether the agent is acting pursuant
to company policy or on his own. 12 The few cases involving individual
claims of discrimination that do not primarily rely on company policy are
described as being brought against the employer, with no discussion about
whether the employer's liability is derivative or direct.13
tion for a switchman position); Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 781, 781 (E.D. La.
1967) (alleging discrimination based on company policy that required women to resign upon mar-
riage); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332, 336 (S.D. Ind. 1967) (alleging that compa-
ny's use of male and female layoff lists was discriminatory); Evenson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 268 F.
Supp. 29, 30 (E.D. Va. 1967) (alleging discrimination based on company policy that required women
to resign upon marriage); Int'l Chem. Workers Union v. Planters Mfg. Co., 259 F. Supp. 365, 366 &
n.1 (N.D. Miss. 1966) (alleging that company did not include "Negro employees in the top operating
classifications" and that it maintained discriminatory wage rates, and discriminated in overtime pay
and allowance of vacation time); United States v. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 271 F. Supp. 447,
450 (E.D. Mo. 1966) (alleging that unions had policy discriminating against people based on race);
Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. R.R. Co., No. CA 65-477, 1966 WL 68, at *1 (N.D. Ala. July 13, 1966)
(alleging employer and union maintained a discriminatory seniority roster); Hall v. Werthan Bag
Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 188 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) (alleging the employer maintained a segregated job
structure). Although some of the early cases do not specifically mention a company policy or proce-
dure, the nature of the claims and the posture of the case suggest that company-wide claims are likely
at issue. See, e.g., Dent v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 265 F. Supp. 56, 57 (N.D. Ala. 1967) (raising
individual and class-based race discrimination claim against union and employer), rev'd, 406 F.2d 399
(5th Cir. 1969); Freese v. John Morrell & Co., No. 7-1823-C-1, 1966 WL 89, at *1 (S.D. Iowa Nov.
16, 1966) (alleging that women were discriminated against by employer and union). Many of the early
decisions do not fully describe the claims being asserted by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Stebbins v. Na-
tionwide Mut. Ins. Co., 382 F.2d 267, 267 (4th Cir. 1967) (describing that plaintiff sent in an applica-
tion and was denied a job, but not stating specifically whether denial was due to policy or individual
practice); Mickel v. S.C. State Employment Serv., 377 F.2d 239, 240 (4th Cir. 1967) (alleging that
employment agency refused to process application based on race, but not indicating whether based on
policy or individual action); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 842, 844 (E.D. Va. 1967)
(indicating only that both individual and class race discrimination issues were raised).
10. Hall, 251 F. Supp. at 188.
11. See, e.g., Int'l Chem. Workers Union, 259 F. Supp. at 366 & n.1 (alleging that black workers
were subjected to racial insults, in addition to claims of segregated workforce and discriminatory
wages).
12. See, e.g., Edwards v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 291 F. Supp. 199, 202 (C.D. Cal. 1968)
(alleging that a member of management tried to coerce plaintiff to work in unsafe conditions, but also
alleging that the company required women to do work that men in the same job description were not
required to perform); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 274 F. Supp. 776, 777 & n.3 (S.D. Ill. 1967)
(alleging that an agent of the employer told plaintiff that "she would not be employed for the reason
that defendant would employ men to the exclusion of women as factory workers so long as male appli-
cants for such work were available"), rev'd, 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968).
13. See Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co., 405 F.2d 645, 647 (4th Cir. 1968) (former
employee alleged that he was terminated for conduct that would not have resulted in termination of
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Given the types of claims being asserted in these Title VII cases, it is
not surprising that the earliest Title VII cases discussing the term "em-
ployer" are not concerned with the imputation of liability to the employer,
but rather with other technical issues, such as whether the employer is one
that employs enough employees to fall within the coverage of the statutel4
or whether the employer falls within one of the statute's exemptions."
During the 1970s, the types of discrimination cases being heard by
federal courts began to change. While the 1970s still witnessed numerous
claims brought against employers and unions based on explicit company
policies that were discriminatory, 16 claims brought by individuals alleging
non-policy-based discrimination began to increase. In the early cases
involving claims of discrimination committed by individual employees,
there is no discussion of agency issues." When the courts did begin to
address the term "employer" in an indirect liability context, the courts
routinely found the employer liable for the acts of agents.1 9 Indeed, some
of the earliest cases also imposed liability on the agents themselves,20 a
holding that has since been rejected by a majority of circuit courts.2 1
white employees); Walker v. Keathley's, Inc., No. C-69-205, 1969 WL 137, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Dec.
30, 1969) (alleging, among other things, that plaintiff was terminated under circumstances in which a
white employee would not have been terminated); Hutchings v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 691,
692 (E.D. Tex. 1969) (plaintiff alleging that he was not given position of shift leader and discontinued
a job classification because of his race), rev'd, 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970); Culpepper v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232, 1234-35 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (employee claiming he was not promoted
based on his race), rev'd, 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970); Washington v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 282 F.
Supp. 517, 518 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (employee alleging he was given a disciplinary layoff based on his
race).
14. See, e.g., U.S. by Clark v. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO,
CLC, 301 F. Supp. 906, 909 (E.D. La. 1969) (mentioning that parties had stipulated to the fact that
defendant met the requirements of an employer); United States v. Med. Soc. of S.C., 298 F. Supp.
145, 152 (D.S.C. 1969) (finding employer with 523 employees falls within Title VII's coverage);
Vogler, 294 F. Supp. at 374 (finding that employers have the requisite number of employees to fall
within the scope of the act); Coon v. Tingle, 277 F. Supp. 304, 306 (N.D. Ga. 1967) (finding that
employers are not large enough to fall within Title VII's coverage).
15. Barrister v. Stineberg, No. 1224, 1967 WL 100, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1967) (indicating
that a hospital is not an employer because it is a private membership organization).
16. See, e.g., Healen v. E. Airlines, Inc., No. 18097, 1973 WL 358, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 10,
1973) (alleging discriminatory policy affecting pregnant flight attendants).
17. See infra notes 18-27.
18. See supra note 13.
19. Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D. N.J. 1976) ("If a super-
visor is acting within the purview of his authority, the doctrine of respondeat superior may be em-
ployed whether he is driving a company car or victimizing a female."), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir.
1977); Slack v. Havens, No. 72-59-GT, 1973 WL 339, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 15, 1973) (indicating
that Title VII imputes liability for the actions of agents and that management had ratified the conduct
of the supervisor); Tidwell v. Am. Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424, 436 (D. Utah 1971) (holding employer
liable when a supervisor fired an individual based on race).
20. Hanshaw v. Del. Tech. & Comm. Coll., 405 F. Supp. 292, 295-96 (D. Del. 1975) (indicat-
ing that individual defendants could be sued because they were acting as agents of the employer);
Byron v. Univ. of Fla., 403 F. Supp. 49, 53 (N.D. Fla. 1975) (same); Doski v. M. Goldseker Co.,
No. B-74-1142, 1975 WL 157, at *8 (D. Md. 1975) (same); Padilla v. Stringer, 395 F. Supp. 495,
497 (D.N.M. 1974) (same); Schaefer v. Tannian, 394 F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (E.D. Mich. 1974)
778
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In the 1970s, employers began to argue that they could not be held re-
sponsible for the discriminatory actions of supervisors or coworkers if
these individuals were not acting according to company policy. 22 In tradi-
tional discrimination cases, courts usually rejected this argument with little
discussion. 23 However, courts were willing to engage in a more robust
discussion of agency issues in cases involving claims of harassment or in
sex discrimination cases where women claimed that their acceptance or
rejection of sexual advances was part of workplace decisionmaking.24 It is
largely through these types of cases that Title VII's agency jurisprudence
developed.25
With the development of these types of claims during the 1970s the
courts appear to begin to struggle with imposing indirect liability on em-
(same).
21. See Creusere v. Bd. of Educ., 88 F. App'x 813, 822 n.12 (6th Cir. 2003); Holly D. v. Cal.
Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003); Newsome v. Admin. Office, 51 F. App'x 76, 79
n.1 (3d Cir. 2002); Arnolie v. Orleans Sch. Bd., 48 F. App'x 917, 917 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam);
Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180-82 (4th Cir. 1998); Gastineau v. Fleet Mortgage
Corp., 137 F.3d 490, 493 (7th Cir. 1998); Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405-06 (6th Cir.
1997); Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 551-53 (3d Cir. 1996); Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898,
900-01 (10th Cir. 1996); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 553-55 (7th Cir. 1995); Tomka v. Seiler
Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313-17 (2d Cir. 1995); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 379-81 (8th Cir. 1995); Cross v. Alabama, 49
F.3d 1490, 1503-04 (11th Cir. 1995); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir.
1993). Although the bulk of the recent district court decisions within the First Circuit have found that
no liability exists under the statute, a minority of courts have held that term "employer" should be
interpreted to allow individual liability. Compare, e.g., Gonzalez v. Guidant Corp., 364 F. Supp. 2d
112, 115-16 (D.P.R. 2005) (holding that Title VII does not provide for individual liability), and Daley
v. Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 92, 104 (D. Mass. 2001) (same), and Acevedo
Vargas v. Colon, 2 F. Supp. 2d 203, 206-07 (D.P.R. 1998) (same), with Douglas v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 855 F. Supp. 518, 520-21 (D.N.H. 1994) (holding that Title VII provides for individual
liability), and Lamirande v. Resolution Trust Corp., 834 F. Supp. 526, 528 (D.N.H. 1993) (same).
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether individual liability attaches under Title VII.
22. See, e.g., Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., Inc., 464 F.2d 723, 725 (6th Cir. 1972);
see also Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047 n.3 (3d Cir. 1977); Williams
v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 660 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated, Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
23. See, e.g., Gay v. Bd. of Trs., 608 F.2d 127, 128 (5th Cir. 1979); Flowers v. Crouch-Walker
Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th Cir. 1977); Anderson, 464 F.2d at 725; see also Calcote v. Texas
Educ. Found., Inc., 578 F.2d 95, 98 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding foundation liable for discriminatory acts
of supervisor).
24. See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) ("It is con-
ceivable, under plaintiffs theory, that flirtations of the smallest order would give rise to liability. The
attraction of males to females and females to males is a natural sex phenomenon and it is probable that
this attraction plays at least a subtle part in most personnel decisions."), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir.
1979); see also infra note 27.
25. See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 212 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying respondeat
superior to hold employer liable when supervisor terminated employee based on her refusal to grant
sexual favors); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 985-90 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding employer liable
when supervisor engaged in harassing activity and terminated employee based on refusal of sexual
advances); Lucero v. Beth Israel Hosp. & Geriatric Ctr., 479 F. Supp. 452, 454 (D. Colo. 1979)
(holding employer liable for harassment). But see Howard v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 388 F. Supp.
603, 605-07 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (refusing to hold company liable for racial harassment by co-workers).
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ployers for the acts of employees.2 6 This period also coincides with disa-
greements among the courts about the contours of harassment and quid pro
quo claims27 and marks a transition in Title VII away from a predominant
reliance on cases challenging explicit discriminatory company policies.28
In cases of harassment or where a woman's employment was affected
by her response to requests for sexual favors, some courts took issue with
the idea that an employer would be indirectly liable for the actions of
agents, who appeared to be acting from purely personal motives,29 espe-
cially when the employer's policy prohibited such conduct and the em-
ployer was either unaware the conduct was occurring or took steps to stop
the behavior. 30 The courts began developing a varied approach to agency
in these contexts.
Many of the early court rulings that found such conduct actionable un-
der Title VII also indicated the employer would be liable for such con-
duct.31 In some cases, liability attached even when no tangible employment
26. See, e.g., Friend v. Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61, 67 (4th Cir. 1978) ("[Tlhe defendants had taken
corrective disciplinary action against white officers and employees who had harassed or discriminated
against blacks. The incidents of racial discrimination against blacks were from fellow employees, had
been isolated and contrary to Bureau policy, and the same had not been participated in or condoned by
the Bureau or any of the defendants.").
27. See, e.g., Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 666 (1st Cir. 1979) (indicating that subjection to
sexual advances without those advances becoming "but for" cause of a subsequent job consequence
was not a cognizable claim under Title VII); Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044,
1048-49 (3d Cir. 1977) (describing disagreement among courts about whether claims are cognizable);
Grayson v. Wickes Corp., 450 F. Supp. 1112, 1118 (N.D. Ill. 1978) ("[T]itle VII does not make an
employer responsible for every inconsiderate remark made by office personnel."); Come v. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (indicating that discriminators' sexual advances
toward a female employee appeared "to be nothing more than a personal proclivity, peculiarity or
mannerism" and were not cognizable under Title VII), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); see also
Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (recognizing sexual harassment as a viable
cause of action under Title VII).
28. Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric,
86 GEO. L.J. 279, 290 (1997) (discussing how cases based on facially discriminatory practices and
policies are rare and asserting that "blatant racial classifications gradually became the exception rather
than the rule in legal challenges involving allegedly discriminatory conduct"); id. at 340 (discussing
that during the 1970s, discrimination as an explanatory hypothesis became less viable as members of
certain protected groups made significant gains in the workplace).
29. See, e.g., Corne, 390 F. Supp. 161 (finding that employer could not be liable because no
company policy allowed harassment and because harassment did not benefit the employer).
30. See, e.g., Ludington v. Sambo's Rests., Inc., 474 F. Supp. 480, 483 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (hold-
ing employer not liable for sexual harassment unless it approved actions or unless actions were taken
based on company policy); Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol Div.), 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1191 (E.D. Pa.
1977) ("[A]n employer cannot be liable for the unauthorized acts of its employees, even if those em-
ployees are front line supervisors."); Howard, 388 F. Supp. at 605 (refusing to hold company liable
for racial harassment by coworkers when company investigated claims, instructed employees not to
engage in behavior, and disciplined one employee for actions).
31. Young v. Sw. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 n.7 (5th Cir. 1975); Lucero v. Beth
Israel Hosp. & Geriatric Ctr., 479 F. Supp. 452, 454 (D. Colo. 1979) (holding employer liable for
harassment when supervisors failed to monitor whether antidiscrimination policies were being carried
out); Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1389 (D. Colo. 1978) (citing Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977)); Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459,
466 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Tidwell v. Am. Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1971). But see Corne,
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action was taken against the employee.32 However, some courts also began
to hold that employers would be exempted from liability for the acts of
their agents in these types of cases under certain circumstances. For ex-
ample, courts would hold that employers were not liable under Title VII if
the employer had a policy prohibiting the discrimination, if the employer
was not apprised of the discrimination or immediately corrected harass-
33ment once it learned of it, or if the employer did not condone the actions.
In some cases courts applied this exemption analysis even when a tangible
employment action was taken against the plaintiff.34
During the late 1970s and into the early 1980s, harassment claims still
constituted a very small portion of the claims being raised by plaintiffs.35
As the courts further developed harassment doctrine in the 1980s, some
courts began to assume that the employer's liability for harassment was
derivative and not direct, and this assumption began to be imbedded in the
legal tests for considering harassment claims. 36 This is not surprising, giv-
en that plaintiffs often were challenging the actions of individuals in creat-
ing harassment.37 In the 1980s and 1990s, the Supreme Court (perhaps
inadvertently) solidified this view of harassment as indirect liability, an
attitude that also began to dominate thinking about other types of individu-
al disparate treatment claims.
390 F. Supp. 161.
32. See, e.g., Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 160 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (holding
company liable for repeated verbal abuse inflicted on a subordinate by a supervisor, but finding that
tangible employment actions not taken based on religion).
33. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1049 (3d Cir. 1977)
(finding that company could be liable when supervisor conditioned good performance evaluation on
acquiescence to sexual advances and when company knew about conduct but failed to correct it);
Barnes, 561 F.2d at 993 (indicating that employer might have been able to escape liability if the dis-
crimination was taken without the employer's knowledge or if it was rectified once discovered); Hee-
lan, 451 F. Supp. at 1388-90 (finding employer could be liable for acts of its agent because it knew
about employment decisions being tied to requests for sexual favors and failed to correct situation);
Munford, 441 F. Supp. at 466 (holding that company could be liable for ratifying supervisor's termi-
nation of employee without investigating whether it was discriminatory); Bell v. St. Regis Paper Co.,
Container Div., 425 F. Supp. 1126, 1137 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (holding employer may be liable by
"merely condoning" harassment by its employees).
34. See, e.g., Ludington, 474 F. Supp. at 483 (holding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim by
alleging they were terminated by supervisor for complaining about his sexual advances).
35. See Kent D. Streseman, Note, Headshrinkers, Manmunchers, Moneygrubbers, Nuts & Sluts:
Reexamining Compelled Mental Examinations in Sexual Harassment Actions Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1268, 1283 n.72 (1995) (noting that the EEOC saw a massive
increase in the number of sexual harassment claims in the early 1980s, reporting only 75 such charges
filed in 1980 and 3,812 in 1981).
36. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982) (describing the fifth
element of a harassment claim as respondeat superior).
37. See id.
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C. Supreme Court Involvement in Indirect Liability
In 1986, the Supreme Court recognized sexual harassment as a cog-
nizable claim under Title VII. 38 In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the
Court indicated that Title VII "surely evinces an intent to place some lim-
its on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be
held responsible." 39 However, the Court struggled with the question of
whether employers should be automatically liable for sexual harassment
and left this question unresolved.40 In 1998, the Supreme Court decided
whether employers would be liable for sexual harassment in two cases,
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth4 1 and Faragher v. City of Boca Ra-
ton,42 both issued by the Court on the same day, with the first opinion
written by Justice Kennedy and the latter by Justice Souter.4 3
Ellerth and Faragher relate to indirect liability, and do not address the
potential direct liability of the employer. However, as this Article argues,
the indirect liability framework developed in these cases soon came to
dominate thinking about employer liability, leading to a current model
where direct liability plays only a minor role.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in both cases demonstrates that the
Court was only concerned with indirect liability, and not direct liability.
The Supreme Court indicated that it was interpreting the part of the defini-
tional section of employer that referred to "agents. "44 The Court inter-
preted this definitional section as an instruction by Congress for the feder-
al courts to "interpret Title VII based on agency principles. "45 In both
cases, the Court characterized the plaintiff's claims as challenging the spe-
38. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
42. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
43. A full discussion of these cases is unnecessary here. Rather, the point that is relevant to the
instant discussion is that neither of these cases deals with direct employer liability. For other scholarly
works critiquing these decisions, see, for example, Theresa M. Beiner, Using Evidence of Women's
Stories in Sexual Harassment Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 117, 131-41 (2001); Joanna
L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form over Substance in Sexual Ha-
rassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 4 (2003). One of the most valid criticisms of Faragher and
Ellerth is that the holding of the cases does not appear to be supported by the agency principles enun-
ciated by the Court. Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment Under Title VII: A Func-
tional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 41, 52, 55 (1999) ("They cited no
common law cases in their cursory, formal, and rather abstract discussion of the Restatement excep-
tion on which they relied. In fact, there seem to be no common law cases that allow any kind of affir-
mative defense to employers.").
44. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)).
45. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754. In Faragher, the Court even noted with approval cases in which the
employer had been held liable because of its "adoption of the offending conduct and its results, quite
as if they had been authorized affirmatively as the employer's policy." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789.
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cific acts of individuals within the organization, rather than a broader
claim of harassment by the organization.46
In developing agency principles for Title VII, the Court looked to the
Restatement (Second) of Agency, Section 219(1), which provides that "[a]
master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while
acting in the scope of their employment."47 Intentional torts committed by
employees are less likely to create liability for the employer because they
may not fall within the scope of the employee's employment.48 In reaching
its ultimate conclusion regarding sexual harassment, the Court held that
sexual harassment is generally outside the scope of employment and that
section 219(1) of the Restatement does not usually provide a basis for em-
ployer indirect liability.4 9
The cases then continue by examining another portion of the Restate-
ment that provides for employer liability for the acts of agents, even if the
actions taken are outside the scope of employment. 0 The Court then listed
the following four scenarios where such liability might be imputed:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the prin-
cipal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was
aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency rela-
tion."
In discussing these four possibilities, the Court indicated that an em-
ployer would be held liable under subsection (a) when the person commit-
46. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754 ("[The issue in this case is] whether an employer has vicarious lia-
bility when a supervisor creates a hostile work environment by making explicit threats to alter a sub-
ordinate's terms or conditions of employment, based on sex, but does not fulfill the threat."); id. at
758 ("Subsection (a) addresses direct liability, where the employer acts with tortious intent, and indi-
rect liability, where the agent's high rank in the company makes him or her the employer's alter ego.
None of the parties contend Slowik's rank imputes liability under this principle."); Faragher, 524
U.S. at 780 ("[The complaint alleged that Terry and Silverman created a 'sexually hostile atmos-
phere' at the beach by repeatedly subjecting Faragher and other female lifeguards to 'uninvited and
offensive touching,' by making lewd remarks, and by speaking of women in offensive terms.").
47. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755-56 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958)).
48. Id.
49. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 796-98; see also Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note Error! Bookmark
not defined., at 768 ("This aspect of the opinion is puzzling because the bulk of the Court's analysis
points to the opposite conclusion than the Court ultimately reached.").
50. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758.
51. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958)).
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ting a discriminatory action was an alter ego of the company.52 The Court
recognized that negligent or reckless conduct on the part of the employer
would lead to liability for discriminatory conduct in some instances.53 The
Court rejected the argument that any nondelegable duties created liability
under subsection (c).54
In looking at factor (d), the Court indicated that, in most cases, an ap-
parent authority argument would not be appropriate." Relying primarily
on the second portion of subsection (d), the Court in Ellerth indicated that
a company would face automatic liability for tangible employment actions
taken against the employee.56 This liability was premised on the idea that
indirect liability is appropriate when an employee is aided and abetted by
the employer in engaging in discriminatory acts. When a company places
a supervisor in a position to take official actions against the employee, the
Court found that liability should be automatically imputed to the employ-
er. 58
However, in instances where a direct supervisor of the plaintiff acted,
but where no tangible employment action resulted, the Court indicated that
employer liability would be presumed, unless the employer could establish
an affirmative defense to the imputation of liability.5 9 In these situations,
an employer can avoid liability if it can establish: "(a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed
to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided
by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." 60 The Court rejected an
interpretation of Title VII that would create employer liability every time
harassing conduct took place in the workplace.6 1
Important to our discussion here, the Court based its employer liability
for tangible employment actions not on the direct liability of the employer,
but rather on an indirect liability theory. The Court did not discuss direct
employer liability for harassment or discuss whether such claims would be
viable. Nonetheless, the Court's focus on indirect liability helped to solidi-
fy a growing assumption about employment discrimination-that it was
largely being perpetrated by individual actors acting with animus.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 759.
54. Id. at 758.
55. Id.
56. Id. It should be noted that in Faragher, the Court does not appear to rely so heavily on the
aiding and abetting analysis when enunciating that an employer is liable for tangible employment
actions. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 784.
57. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 765.
61. Id. at 760.
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One example of this assumption is found in Hill v. Lockheed Martin
Logistics Management, Inc.6 2 In Hill, the plaintiff alleged that an individu-
al who oversaw her work performance called her names such as "useless
old lady," "damn woman," and a "troubled old lady," and told her on
more than one occasion that she "needed to go home and retire."63 Plain-
tiff alleged that this individual submitted false disciplinary reports about
her job performance and encouraged another individual to submit a discip-
linary report regarding her job performance that the individual believed to
be true, but that was actually false.64 Both disciplinary reports were issued
after the plaintiff claimed that she was being discriminated against, and no
one investigated plaintiff's claim of discrimination or the veracity of the
disciplinary reports.65 Nor did anyone question whether the reports might
be in retaliation for plaintiff's complaints of discrimination.66 These discip-
linary reports were then forwarded to other supervisors further up the
plaintiff's chain of supervision, who made the decision to terminate the
plaintiff based on a company policy that permitted an individual to be ter-
minated after a certain number of disciplinary reports.67 The plaintiff was
the only woman on her work team, and she was replaced by a man.68
In granting summary judgment in favor of the employer, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the employer could not be held
liable for the conduct of the biased individual, even if that individual
played a substantial role in the termination of the plaintiff, because he did
"not make the final or formal employment decision."69 The Court of Ap-
peals based its reasoning on the Supreme Court's earlier agency cases.70
While the Fourth Circuit may be wrong in its interpretation of indirect
liability, its analysis is notable for another reason. Based on its interpreta-
tion of the Supreme Court precedent, the Court of Appeals viewed dis-
crimination as only happening through the actions of the corporate agents
and failed to consider whether company or business unit practices and
culture might have caused the discrimination.
Over the past five decades, the courts have transitioned from a mind-
set showing a lack of concern about agency issues and assuming employer
62. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc. (Hill l), 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004). As
with many employment discrimination cases, the set of facts as set forth by the Fourth Circuit sitting
en banc are at odds with those as recited by the panel. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc.
(Hill 1), 314 F.3d 657 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004). Because the case was
decided on a summary judgment request, the Article uses the version of the facts that favor the plain-
tiff, the non-movant.
63. Hill I, 314 F.3d at 660.
64. Id. at 660-61.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Hill H1, 354 F.3d at 282.
68. Hill I, 314 F.3d at 662.




involvement and liability to one where agency (at least implicitly) plays an
important role in liability and where employer involvement is often not
assumed. Courts appear to now recognize at least four distinct types of
employer liability for individual disparate treatment claims under Title
VII: indirect liability for the acts of certain supervisors, identification lia-
bility for the acts of certain high-level agents," direct liability for corpo-
rate policies, and liability for fault in allowing discrimination by cowork-
ers, third parties, and supervisors outside plaintiff's immediate reporting
line. This Article posits that there is also a fifth basis for imposing such
liability: direct liability based on the intent of the corporate enterprise.
II. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY AN UNDER-THEORIZED
DEFINITION OF EMPLOYER INTENT
The central theme of this Article is that overreliance on indirect liabili-
ty has unnecessarily curbed the development of Title VII's concepts of
corporate intent. Although admittedly a strong claim, this Article hopes to
demonstrate that each of the following five problems can either be com-
pletely resolved by or at least alleviated by a more completely theorized
concept of direct liability. Those problems include conceptualizations of
discrimination that rely on the rogue actor, oversimplification of
workplace decisionmaking, overreliance on the stray remarks doctrine, a
current inability to incorporate unconscious and structural discrimination
theories into workable liability frameworks, and the false division of em-
ployment discrimination claims into fixed categories.
Before undertaking such a task, it is necessary to make one definition-
al caveat. This Article proceeds under the assumption that courts require a
showing of some type of intent to prevail on an individual disparate treat-
ment claim, and this Article uses such terminology. This Article does not
advocate the position that disparate treatment requires proof of intent. Ra-
ther, it asserts, as a descriptive matter, that in many instances the courts
appear to require intent to prove a disparate treatment claim72 and that in
71. See Colvin, supra note 6, at 2 (describing identification liability).
72. See, e.g., Derek W. Black, A Framework for the Next Civil Rights Act: What Tort Concepts
Reveal About Goals, Results, and Standards, 60 RUTGERS L. REv. 259, 270-71 (2008) (discussing
intent); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 899, 920
(1993); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved With Good Intentions?: Stuck
on State of Mind in Antidiscrimination Law, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1141, 1145 (2007) (indicating
that individual disparate claims require intent); Selmi, supra note 28, at 288 (defining intent in dis-
crimination cases); Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate Treat-
ment Under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 1107, 1118, 1136-37 (1991) (discussing the distinction
between intent and causation and asserting that "the intent of the employer" is the "critical issue" in
disparate treatment cases); Martha S. West, Gender Bias in Academic Robes: The Law's Failure to
Protect Women Faculty, 67 TEMPLE L. REv. 67, 97-103 (1994) (suggesting that intent was not a
required element under Title VII until 1981). See generally Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton
Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA.
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many instances where the underlying allegation is individual disparate
treatment or harassment, the type of intent that the courts require is one of
animus or illicit motive.73 The claims made herein are not dependent upon
the existence of an intent element, and the central underlying premise-
that the company may be an actor-is still important even if individual
disparate treatment cases are only viewed as requiring that an individual
be treated differently because of a protected trait.74
A. Rogue Actor
One of the current problems in employment discrimination law is that
courts view discrimination largely as "a problem of errant or rogue indi-
vidual discriminators acting contrary to organizational policy and inter-
est."' To be sure, some workplace discrimination follows such a model,
but such a conception fails to address the full panoply of possible discrim-
ination.
Such a conception is attributable, at least in part, to primary reliance
on indirect, rather than direct, employer liability. As discussed earlier, in
both harassment cases and cases where a tangible employment action is
taken, modern courts have begun relying on a model of employer liability
premised on the idea of indirect liability. Characterizing these actions as
ones based on derivative, rather than direct, liability has important conse-
quences for discrimination law.
Traditional enunciations of indirect liability require a plaintiff to be
able to prove that there is an identifiable employee or group of employees
upon whose actions the company's liability can be premised, as the com-
pany's liability derives from its legal relationship with these individuals,
not upon independent wrongdoing by the company.76 The key question in
an individual disparate treatment case thus becomes who is the blamewor-
L. REv. 495 (2001) (arguing that Title VII should be interpreted as relying on establishment of causa-
tion based on a protected trait, not intent).
73. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REv. 701, 706
(2005) ("[W]e continue to define intentional discrimination in the context of animus and consciously
impermissible motives."). But see Selmi, supra note 28, at 288-89 (arguing that animus or illicit
motive is not a requirement to establish discrimination, but providing affirmative action and disparate
impact cases as exemplars); Sullivan, supra note 72, at 1139-45 (describing various types of conduct
that might constitute the required animus under Title VII).
74. Selmi, supra note 28, at 289 ("What the Court means by intent is that an individual or group
was treated differently because of race.").
75. Tristin K. Green, Insular Individualism: Employment Discrimination Law After Ledbetter v.
Goodyear, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 353, 356 (2008); see also West, supra note 72, at 97 ("[T]he
Court has consistently viewed the problem of employment discrimination as simply the manifestation
of unfair actions by a few prejudiced decision-makers taking biased but isolated action against individ-
ual employees.").
76. See Colvin, supra note 6, at 2-9.
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thy individual (or group of individuals) who took an action upon whom the
employer's liability can be premised.
In some cases, the search for the rogue actor is appropriate; however,
in others, the search for the rogue actor asks the wrong question about
culpability. It ignores the fact that multi-tiered or group decisionmaking
processes may make it difficult or impossible to locate intent within a par-
ticular person. The rogue actor analysis disregards the ways that both for-
mal and informal processes and policies within an organization shape the
intentions and actions of its individual members, and the ways that the
actions and intentions of the individual members shape the organization. In
other words, while "organizations would not exist without individuals,
... it is also equally true that phenomena such as ... groupthink would
not exist without organizations.""
Even when a bad actor does exist, an overreliance on indirect liability
sometimes causes courts to narrowly examine the acts of only that actor.
Reconsider the facts of the Hill case discussed earlier. The court did not
hold the company liable for discrimination because the person with the
obvious discriminatory intent was several levels removed from the ulti-
mate decisionmaker. The court ignored, however, that another supervisor
was told about possible discrimination and retaliation, failed to investigate
those allegations, passed along disciplinary information that may have
been false, and that the company's policies did not require independent
review of the disciplinary reports. The actions of the supervisor and the
company policies amplified the effect of the original discriminator's intent,
yet the focus on the rogue actor allows the court to ignore these facts.
B. Oversimplification of Workplace Decisionmaking
Under an indirect liability model, courts at times seem to oversimplify
how workplace decisions are made, often viewing the workplace as oper-
ating under a top-down, hierarchal management structure, where discrete
and identifiable employment decisions are independently made by supervi-
sors." This phenomenon appears to be closely related to the rogue actor
problem. Again, based on a need to identify culpable actors upon whom
corporate liability can be appended and the specific actions that those ac-
tors have taken to discriminate, courts faced with an individual disparate
treatment claim tend to focus fairly narrowly on "the" employment deci-
sion at issue.
In many instances, one individual is not responsible for employment
decisions. Rather, multiple individuals may act either independently or as
77. Metzger & Dalton, supra note 6, at 555 (citations omitted).
78. West, supra note 72, at 97.
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a group to make a final decision.7 9 Such decisionmaking can occur in a
multitude of different ways, but providing a few examples will more con-
cretely demonstrate how direct liability could be beneficial in such in-
stances.
For example, in some corporations the day-to-day supervisors of em-
ployees are not the individuals vested with the power to make ultimate
employment decisions, such as whether to terminate an individual. While
these situations are supposed to lead to more considered decisionmaking,
in some instances, the immediate supervisor may act with discriminatory
motive in recommending that an employment action be taken, and the
higher-level supervisor, without such a motivation, rubberstamps the dis-
criminatory recommendation and effectuates the job action." Or perhaps
one supervisor, intending to discriminate, places a negative evaluation in
an employee's file. Later, another individual, without discriminatory intent
and without knowing the bias of the original supervisor, uses the negative
evaluation as the basis for making a decision-perhaps whether the indi-
vidual will be affected by a reduction-in-force. Under an indirect liability
model, a plaintiff will have difficulty identifying a particular employee
upon whom liability can be premised, because the act and the intent reside
in different people.
Although some courts have held that a plaintiff can prove a prima fa-
cie case in the instances described above," they disagree about the cir-
cumstances necessary for such liability to attach, with some courts willing
to find liability in only limited circumstances.8 2 While some of the difficul-
ty with these cases relates to whether Title VII's substantive language re-
quires intent or whether it merely expresses causation, this problem is
exacerbated by the focus on indirect liability.83
Another instance where indirect liability may be problematic is in cas-
es of collective or multi-tiered decisionmaking, where it may be difficult
79. One example of complex decision making is presented in academic hiring. For a discussion of
gender discrimination issues related to academics, see generally West, supra note 72, at 96 ("[F]aculty
personnel decisions are made by a series of faculty committees, using highly subjective standards.").
80. See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort & Alison L. Olig, Within Grasp of the Cat's Paw: Delineating
the Scope of Subordinate Bias Liability Under Federal Antidiscrirnination Statutes, 60 S.C. L. REv.
383, 385-86 (2008) (describing "cat's paw" theory of liability, referring to employer liability resulting
from subordinate bias).
81. Willis v. Marion County Auditor's Office, 118 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 1997); Wallace v. SMC
Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394 (7th Cir. 1997); Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300 (5th Cir.
1996); Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 50 F.3d 1204 (3d Cir. 1995); Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 990 F.2d 1051 (8th Cir. 1993); Gusman v. Unisys Corp., 986 F.2d 1146 (7th Cir. 1993);
Simpson v. Diversitech Gen. Inc., 945 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1991); Jiles v. Ingram, 944 F.2d 409 (8th
Cir. 1991); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990).
82. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 289-91 (4th Cir. 2004)
(recognizing that cat's paw liability might exist in some circumstances, but did not exist in this in-
stance, even though the intentional actor may have substantially contributed to the plaintiff's termina-
tion); Befort & Olig, supra note 80, at 385-86.
83. See Befort & Olig, supra note 80, at 398-412.
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to determine the singular individual or group of individuals who both en-
gaged in the employment actions and possessed the requisite intent. In-
deed, such an inquiry may be inappropriate, as it may be the group dy-
namic itself, with multiple and various inputs from various actors, that
results in a particular decision being made, and not the intent of any one
or more identifiable actors.84
A focus on indirect liability also makes it easier to underestimate the
ways that biased decisionmaking can be cloaked in objective terms and can
infect an entire process. Reconsider the Hill case discussed earlier. In Hill,
one allegedly biased reviewer of plaintiff's work submitted numerous dis-
ciplinary reports, some of which were false and others of which were pet-
ty and typically would not have resulted in discipline . The immediate
supervisor was aware of plaintiff's allegations of discrimination and retali-
ation, but passed along the biased (yet facially objective) disciplinary re-
ports to two higher-level supervisors, who made the decision to terminate
plaintiff.86 It may be true to assert that the last two supervisors in the chain
did not act discriminatorily; however, it is inaccurate to also conclude that
the plaintiff was not discriminated against. While a jury may not ultimate-
ly find employer intent based on these facts, the plaintiff should be able to
argue that corporate intent existed.
Another problem arises when courts focus too heavily on the concept
of a single employment decision. For example, courts looking at discrimi-
nation claims will often examine only evidence related to a particular em-
ployment action. However, as Linda Hamilton Krieger has explained,
sometimes what appears to be a singular decision is instead a conclusion
reached after months or years of interaction with an employee, based on a
manager's subjective evaluation of that employee . And that long, subjec-
tive decisionmaking process may be affected by both overt stereotyping
and more subtle forms of discrimination.
Further, a focus on finding "the" employment decision that resulted in
discrimination ignores that animus can be demonstrated by the failure to
take action. Consider an employer that consistently fails to investigate
claims of discrimination and fails to punish employees who engage in dis-
crimination. These repeated failures likely send a strong and powerful
message within the workplace that, in some circumstances, may be tanta-
mount to a policy allowing such discrimination. However, indirect liability
analysis makes it difficult for courts to analyze such claims if the court is
searching for an individual who made a discriminatory decision.
84. White & Krieger, supra note 72, at 532.
85. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 314 F.3d 650, 660-62 (4th Cir. 2003), va-
cated, 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004).
86. Id.
87. Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative
Action, 86 CAL. L. REv. 1251, 1258-76 (1998).
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As demonstrated in Parts IV and V below, borrowing other theories of
corporate liability will provide courts with a basis for more broadly con-
ceptualizing workplace decisionmaking.
C. Stray Remarks Doctrine
The stray remarks doctrine also poses a problem within the employ-
ment discrimination field, and this problem is one that shares some con-
nection with the focus on the rogue actor and a simplified view of
workplace decisionmaking. Under the stray remarks doctrine, courts often
consider comments to be irrelevant to the issue of whether discrimination
occurred if those comments are made by nonsupervisors, are remote in
time from the employment decision at hand, or demonstrate bias against
another protected class." A court that is focused on indirect liability may
simply be trying to locate the individual who discriminated and exclude
evidence that was not related to that individual's decisionmaking process.
However, even in the indirect liability context, the stray remarks doc-
trine may be too expansive, causing courts to limit the types of evidence
that plaintiffs can marshal on behalf of their claims of individual discrimi-
nation. Commentators have argued that outright exclusion of such evi-
dence on relevance grounds is not appropriate, as such a ruling robs the
plaintiff of the ability to prove the context in which a decision is made.89
As one commentator indicated: "If the decisionmaker acted in a work en-
vironment in which discriminatory remarks and behavior were common
and went unchecked by the employer, then it is more likely that the deci-
sionmaker acted with discriminatory bias."'
Remarks being made by coworkers and others within the workplace
may influence the decision ultimately made, as a decisionmaker may either
explicitly or implicitly take these remarks into consideration when making
an employment decision. Further, especially with subjective assessments
that could be made over time, a comment that was made several years
away from the final decision may demonstrate that the decisionmaker had
biased viewpoints that led either directly or indirectly to faulty or even
false assessments of the employee's performance.
Not only can these remarks be evidence of the intent of a specific in-
dividual, in at least some instances the remarks should be considered to be
evidence of corporate discriminatory intent. To rephrase the quoted lan-
guage above, work environments in which discriminatory remarks and
behavior are common and unchecked may show not only that a decision-
88. Green, supra note 75, at 365-66.
89. Id. at 377-78.
90. Id. at 368.
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maker acted with discriminatory bias, but also that the employer intended
such a result.
As discussed above, indirect liability causes courts to focus on a single
decision, made by a single decisionmaker, during a particular period of
time. The stray remarks doctrine is an evidentiary limitation that supports
such a conception of the workplace. By more broadly conceptualizing who
or what is responsible for creating a discriminatory environment, direct
corporate liability can highlight the problems with the stray remarks doc-
trine.
D. Unconscious Discrimination and Structural Discrimination
The concepts of unconscious discrimination and structural discrimina-
tion are gaining theoretical traction within the employment discrimination
field;9 1 however, the available discrimination proof structures have not yet
embraced these ideas of discrimination.9 2 Unconscious discrimination po-
sits that at least some discrimination is carried out by actors who do not
possess conscious intent to discriminate, but still make judgments about
individuals based on the individual's protected class. 93 Structural discrimi-
nation is premised on the idea that the way the workplace is organized,
including its decisionmaking processes, may lead to discrimination. 94
For the proponents of these conceptualizations of discrimination, de-
veloping a robust concept of direct corporate liability may be helpful in
transforming the theory into a remediable legal violation. This is because
convincing courts that unconscious or structural discrimination exists is
only half of the issue-the other half of the problem is convincing courts
to provide for employer liability for such discrimination. If courts consider
the employer's liability to be derivative, it may be hard for them to focus
91. See generally, e.g., Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive
Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1241 (2002); Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Anti-
discrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REv. 849 (2007) [hereinafter Green,
Structural Approach]; Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 91 (2003) [hereinafter Green,
Workplace Dynamics]; Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56
ALA. L. REv. 741 (2005); Krieger, supra note 87, at 1258-76; Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La Evolu-
ci6n!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 421-26
(2000). But see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law,
94 CAL. L. REv. 1 (2006) (arguing that a structural approach to employment discrimination law un-
dermines it); Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Min-
dreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006) (suggesting that the idea of unconscious discrimination is
based on flawed science).
92. Hart, supra note 91, at 749-50 (discussing how focus on pretext draws a distinction between
conscious and unconscious discrimination).
93. Id. at 747.
94. See generally Green, Structural Approach, supra note 91; Green, Workplace Dynamics, supra
note 91.
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on workplace structure, rather than solely the misdeeds of individual em-
ployees.
Further, if courts are reluctant to impose indirect liability on employ-
ers for the conscious harassment of their employees, it seems even more
likely that courts would be reluctant to impose such liability when the ac-
tions are based on unconscious discrimination. Indeed, some courts may
be unwilling to place indirect liability on employers even for tangible em-
ployment actions based on unconscious discrimination, because of an un-
willingness to require the employer to bear the burden of employees' inhe-
rent thought processes. As Professor Melissa Hart posits: "[I]t seems at
least arguable that every time a minority or woman is denied a job or a
promotion, or suffers some other adverse employment action, race or
gender played some role in the decision."9 If this is the reality of em-
ployment decisionmaking, placing indirect liability on an employer for
such unconscious discrimination seems to place the employer in an im-
possible legal position, where it is difficult for the employer to prove that
the decision at issue was motivated not by unconscious discrimination, but
by some other permissible factor.
However, if courts become convinced that practical methods exist to
eliminate or reduce the effects of unconscious discrimination in the
workplace, those courts may believe it is appropriate to apply direct liabil-
ity to an employer who has failed to engage in such efforts. In other
words, these courts may find that an employer is liable for actionable dis-
crimination when it knows or is substantially certain that unconscious or
structural discrimination is being facilitated through its processes, but still
continues to use decisionmaking tools that facilitate such discrimination,
such as overreliance on subjective decisionmaking when objective indica-
tors of performance are available, allowing supervisors to continue to
make unchecked subjective decisions that appear to contradict objective
indicators of employee performance, or failing to provide training about
unconscious decisionmaking.96
E. Categorization of Discrimination
Yet another problem with discrimination jurisprudence is the courts'
need to rigidly classify the type of claim being brought by a plaintiff into
one of several recognized proof structures, such as individual intentional
discrimination,97 pattern or practice, 98 disparate impact, 99 or harassment.100
95. Hart, supra note 91, at 774-75.
96. See also Krieger, supra note 87, at 1291 (arguing that it may be helpful to instruct people
about potential bias); Oppenheimer, supra note 72, at 969-70 (arguing that employers should be held
to a negligence standard for failure to institute workplace norms that limit opportunities for discrimina-
tion).
97. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (creating a proof structure for
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At times, the claim that a plaintiff is trying to bring does not fit nicely
within any one proof structure, and the separation of the proof structures
allows the courts to dispose of each claim separately, finding that no dis-
crimination has occurred.
We can easily posit a hypothetical falling within the cracks of several
different types of claims. A woman works in a unit with thirty employees,
only five of whom are women. Although the ratio of female-to-male
workers has remained fairly stable over a period of time, there is a high
turnover rate of female employees, many of whom have left after express-
ing various different gender-related complaints, such as concerns over the
existence of a maternal wall or a glass ceiling, experiences of sexual ha-
rassment, and concerns that women were not being given the same oppor-
tunities to interact with clients. None of the former female employees want
to file a lawsuit against the company, as they have all moved on to suc-
cessful careers elsewhere.
The plaintiff alleges that she is not invited to out-of-the-office social
events, which affects her ability to develop relationships within the office
and with clients. She believes that such exclusion will affect her in the
future, because she will not have the client base necessary for future pro-
motions. She also feels socially isolated within the office. During a recent
review, the plaintiff was criticized for failing to fit in with the company
culture, but no tangible employment action was taken. Both supervisors
and nonsupervisors have made derogatory, gender-based remarks to the
plaintiff over time, but such comments are not severe and/or pervasive
enough to constitute actionable harassment.
The hypothetical posed demonstrates a scenario in which discrimina-
tion may be occurring; however, under the current divide-and-conquer
regime of employment discrimination jurisprudence, the plaintiff is unlike-
ly to be able to make it past summary judgment. A court is likely to find
that the plaintiff cannot establish a disparate impact claim because the of-
fice size and the number of women affected is not large enough to be sta-
tistically significant."o0 Nor will the plaintiff be able to establish the specif-
individual disparate treatment claims based on circumstantial evidence).
98. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (recognizing pattern or practice
claim).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006) (codifying disparate impact under Title VII); Smith v. City of
Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (plurality opinion) (recognizing disparate impact theory under the
ADEA); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (recognizing claim for disparate impact).
100. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (recognizing a claim for sexual ha-
rassment). Employment discrimination also recognizes claims for retaliation and failure to accommo-
date. See, e.g., CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008) (retaliation); U.S. Airways, Inc.
v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (failure to accommodate).
101. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (describing the burden of proof in disparate
impact cases); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977) (finding statistical
evidence probative when it compares percentage of women in employer's work force with the percen-
tage in the relevant labor market).
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ic employment practice that led to a disparate impact. Plaintiff will not
prevail on an individual disparate treatment claim because she will not be
able to show that she has suffered actionable discrimination.102 The plain-
tiff may not be able to prevail on a pattern or practice claim because of the
statistical deficiencies in her case and because the types of gender discrim-
ination experienced by other former coworkers do not fit within a consis-
tent legal theory. 103 The plaintiff will not be able to prevail on a harass-
ment claim because the conduct is not severe or pervasive enough to con-
stitute actionable discrimination.104
Such stratified thinking about proof structures ignores that discrimina-
tion should be able to be proven in cases that do not fit nicely within the
proof structure parameters of any one particular theory. However, our
current system pigeonholes the plaintiff's experiences and causes of action
in unrealistic ways.
Such a dynamic may be driven by cognitive ease, but it may also be
driven, in part and perhaps invisibly, by agency issues. Given the predo-
minance of indirect liability in most harassment and other individual dispa-
rate treatment cases, it may be difficult to combine such claims with theo-
ries of discrimination that rely on direct employer liability, such as dispa-
rate impact or pattern and practice claims. Further, using an indirect lia-
bility model makes it difficult to apply liability when each individual ac-
tor's conduct would not rise to the level of cognizability, but when the
combined actions of many actors work to create discrimination.
III. CONSIDERING ANOTHER CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CORPORATE
INTENT
This Part posits that a broader understanding of corporate intent can
ameliorate many problems related to Title VII. Given that in the employ-
ment discrimination context the Supreme Court has created its own inter-
pretation of how agency issues operate, this Part will focus on ways of
assessing intent that do not rely on indirect liability theories, as they have
traditionally been articulated. Importing the concept of corporate character
from emerging corporate and criminal law scholarship into Title VII pro-
vides another way for courts to conceive of discrimination liability, with
minimal conflict to the existing Title VII doctrine.
In the wake of recent corporate scandals, both the civil and criminal
law have been increasingly pressed into service to hold corporations liable
102. See, e.g., Johnston v. Amax Coal Co., 963 F. Supp. 758 (S.D. id. 1997); see also Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (describing the burden of proof in individual disparate
treatment cases), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
103. See, e.g., Int'd Bhd of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) (describing the
burden of proof in a pattern or practice case).
104. See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69 (requiring "pervasive" harassment).
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for intentional conduct.0 ' Implicit in the imposition of liability is the rec-
ognition that corporations can possess intent. Historically, the concept of
respondeat superior provided the primary model under which intent was
imputed from the acts of individuals to their corporate employers. 106
However, the idea of corporate character is developing traction in
corporate case law within the United States,107 both in the civil and crimi-
nal contexts. 1o The concept of corporate character, undergirded by a real-
ist view of the corporation, posits that the corporation has a life and intent
of its own, separate from the individual actions of its agents.1 09 Although
recognizing that companies cannot possess intent in exactly the same way
humans do, the idea of corporate character posits that these entities can
possess intent that can be ascribed to them and for which they can be held
legally accountable. 110
Rather than merely mimicking the individual intents of its agents, the
company develops its own organizational structures and processes. The
"procedures, formal rules, and informal understandings" of the organiza-
tion begin to shape the attitudes and actions of its employees, who are
often economically dependent on the organization."' Corporate character
105. This Article does not express any opinion about the appropriateness of corporate criminal
liability. For a further discussion of this issue, see, for example, Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes,
Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (1996); Friedman, supra note 6; V.S. Khanna, Corporate
Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1477 (1996). For a brief history
of the development of corporate criminal liability in the United States, see Friedman, supra, at 835-
39.
106. See, e.g., Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazdbal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 81 (2006) (discussing reliance on respondeat superior); Friedman, supra note
6, at 836-37 (discussing adoption of respondeat superior as a basis for corporate criminal liability);
Metzger & Dalton, supra note 6, at 500 (same); Michael Viano & Jenny R. Arnold, Corporate Crimi-
nal Liability, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 311, 312 (2006) (discussing respondeat superior and corporate
intent).
107. For a discussion of the development of corporate criminal liability outside the United States,
see, for example, Eli Lederman, Models for Imposing Corporate Crminal Liability: From Adaptation
and Imitation Toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 641, 644-
47 (2000) (discussing developments in Israel and Europe); Martin J. Weinstein & Patricia Bennett
Ball, Ciminal Law's Greatest Mystery Thriller: Corporate Guilt Through Collective Knowledge, 29
NEW ENG. L. REv. 65, 82-90 (1994) (discussing developments in certain European countries and
Japan). For a discussion of other theories of imputing scienter to corporations, see William S. Laufer,
Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647, 665-66 (1994) (discussing proactive and
reactive corporate fault, as well as his own theory of constructive corporate liability).
108. This Article has chosen to use the term corporate character and has provided a definition of
this concept. The growing literature in this area uses a variety of names for this concept and some-
times uses the same name to describe multiple concepts. See, e.g., Abril & Olazdbal, supra note 106,
at 115. Although this Article treats this concept as theoretically distinct from respondeat superior, at
least one commentator has suggested that concepts of collective knowledge may simply be a practical
way of dealing with evidentiary problems related to respondeat superior. See V.S. Khanna, Is the
Notion of Corporate Fault A Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REv. 355,
408-09 (1999).
109. See supra note 6.
110. Bucy, supra note 6, at 1107.
111. Colvin, supra note 6, at 23-24 ("Organizations comprise not only individuals but also institu-
tionalized relationships among individuals."); Lederman, supra note 107, at 688; Jennifer A. Quaid,
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liability is premised, in part, on the idea that a company as an entity can
change these processes, rules, and informal understandings to change both
how decisions are made and the goals that underlie such decisionmak-
ing. 112
As one commentator explained, under the corporate character model,
while the underlying acts are performed by human actors, "the inquiry
into the question of liability . .. begins directly at the corporation, analyz-
ing the link between the performance of corporate systems and the pro-
priety of its processes on the one hand, and the commission of the offense
in question on the other."113
The idea that a company has an identity separate from its individual
agents has gained momentum in recent decades as corporations have be-
come more complex, as the law has developed a rights claiming jurispru-
dence for nonhuman entities, as interdisciplinary research began exploring
the dynamics of corporations,114 and as corporations have demanded status
similar to legal persons in other areas."
Although some companies still operate in a hierarchal structure ulti-
mately directed by one individual or a group of individuals, many compa-
nies operate under more complex structures, whose identities continue to
exist, separate from their ever-changing workforce.116 The complexity of
the structure, the anonymity of certain decisionmaking, the interaction of
numerous subunits within the organization, the fact that all of the informa-
tion needed to make a decision may be possessed by different individuals,
the need to incorporate competing concerns and organizational prefe-
rences, and the fact that people tend to make different decisions in groups
than they would individually,117 leads to situations where the ultimate deci-
sion reached on a particular issue may not reflect the intent of any one
identifiable individual or group of individuals.
The corporate character idea finds practical application in the Australi-
an Model Criminal Code, which appears to adopt a corporate scienter ba-
The Assessment of Corporate Criminal Liability on the Basis of Corporate Identity: An Analysis, 43
MCGILL L.J. 67, 72 (1998) (describing corporations as having a "distinct personality of a collective
entity, which subsumes the individual personalities composing it").
112. Quaid, supra note 111, at 84.
113. Lederman, supra note 107, at 681 (discussing the same concept, but calling it a self-identity
model of corporate behavior).
114. Bucy, supra note 6, at 1124-26 (discussing organizational behavior research); Lederman,
supra note 107, at 681-86.
115. Quaid, supra note 111, at 84-86 (discussing recognition of organizational rights). See general-
ly Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a Consistent Approach
to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L. REv. 793 (1996)
(discussing corporations' Constitutional rights related to criminal law and procedure).
116. Quaid, supra note 111, at 77 (recognizing "the enduring existence of organizational identity
... in the light of changing membership").




sis for liability. It allows for corporate intent to be shown, even if that
intent is not present in any one agent, if corporate culture "directed, en-
couraged, tolerated or led to non-compliance."". The Code further defines
"corporate culture" as "an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or
practice existing within the body corporate generally or within the area of
the body corporate in which the relevant activities take place."11 9 The cor-
porate character theory recognizes "that corporate intent may stand apart
from the intent of individual corporate agents. Thus, the focus of the intent
inquiry shifts from the individual to the corporation's internal systems,
including its personality, decisionmaking structure, and policies."120
This model of corporate scienter accomplishes three important tasks.
First, it recognizes that corporate scienter may be different than the intent
of particular individuals. Second, because employers do not necessarily
express intent in the same way individuals do, it provides examples of
ways in which corporate scienter can be demonstrated. Third, it recogniz-
es that corporate scienter need not exist on a company-wide basis, but
rather can exist within the area of the employer in which the illegal activi-
ty takes place.
The view of the corporation envisioned by corporate character theory
highlights the problems of relying on an indirect liability model as the
primary model for imposing liability in the Title VII context. While some
discrimination certainly follows the indirect liability model, Title VII anti-
discrimination mandates cannot be fully recognized without a fuller con-
ception of direct liability.
IV. APPLYING CORPORATE CHARACTER IN THE EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CONTEXT
This Part discusses the ways in which Title VII jurisprudence already
tacitly recognizes the corporate character concept. Although the specific
118. Model Criminal Code: Chapter 2, General Principles of Criminal Responsibility § 501.2.1
[hereinafter Austl. Model Criminal Code]; see also Colvin, supra note 6, at 34-35 (discussing Aus-
tralian Model Criminal Code).
119. Austl. Model Criminal Code, § 501.2.2; Colvin, supra note 6, at 35-36. The Australian
Criminal Code goes one step further and even allows for the criminal liability for a corporation that
fails to require a culture of compliance. Austl. Model Criminal Code, § 501.2.1.
120. Abril & Olazdbal, supra note 106, at 129. Although the corporate character theory has not
been systematically adopted within federal criminal law in the United States, it can be identified as a
concept underlying courts' acceptance of inconsistent verdicts in cases charging individuals and (deri-
vatively) companies for criminal conduct. In some of these cases, the jury will acquit the individual,
but find that the corporation is guilty. Moore, supra note 6, at 762 (citing United States v. Dotter-
weich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); Am. Med. Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942);
United States v. Gen'l Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 411 (7th Cir. 1941)). It is also possible that the
jury is acting irrationally or contrary to the law when issuing such verdicts. Such verdicts may reflect
an idea that corporations possess responsibility outside of that created by individual agents.
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details of corporate character-based theories of liability vary,121 this Part
attempts to posit circumstances under which most corporate character
theorists would place liability with the corporation, to connect those cir-
cumstances with employment discrimination jurisprudence, and to discuss
how application of the corporate character concept would resolve current
problems within employment discrimination itself.
A. Employment Discrimination Law's Tacit Recognition of Corporate
Intent
The theoretical seeds for the corporate character theory already exist
within current employment discrimination jurisprudence. The central tenet
of the corporate character concept is that a corporation can possess an
intent distinct from that of individual employees. The Supreme Court has
implicitly recognized this central tenet within the employment discrimina-
tion field. 122 While recent Supreme Court cases appear to view discrimina-
tion as the fault of a rogue actor, this recognition alone expresses the idea
that the corporation's intent and that of its agents is different. 123
Additionally, an employer may escape liability for punitive damages,
if it shows that an employee's conduct was contrary to good faith efforts
of the company to comply with Title VII. 124 Inherent in this affirmative
defense is the recognition that the employer's intent is not synonymous
with those of individual employees.
Title VII cases in which an employer is held liable for its facially dis-
criminatory policies also suggest that intent can reside in the entity, rather
than in individuals. Although these direct evidence cases are rare in the
modem context, it can be credibly argued that they convey the idea that
the facially discriminatory policies represent the "intent" of the corpora-
tion.
Further, the idea of corporate character is compatible with the under-
lying theory of pattern or practice cases, in which plaintiffs can rely on
statistical disparities within the workforce and other evidence to demon-
strate that intentional discrimination is occurring."* Such liability may be
imposed independent of the individuals within the corporation and is not
derivative. However, due to the way in which pattern or practice claims
have developed, the idea of corporate character imbedded within the cause
121. Moore, supra note 6, at 768.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (acquitting the individual em-
ployee, but finding the corporation guilty); Am. Med. Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C.
Cir. 1942) (same); United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941) (same).
123. See supra note 123.
124. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 544 (1999).
125. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977). Another way of
reaching the result intended by this Article may be to encourage courts to expand the reach of pattern
or practice theory in a modified form into individual disparate treatment claims.
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of action has limited utility for plaintiffs. First, courts often view pattern
or practice cases as being distinct from individual disparate treatment cas-
es. 126 Second, some courts apply pattern or practice analysis only in con-
texts where class certification of a large group of affected employees
would be appropriate. 127 Third, pattern or practice claims are viewed as
requiring proof of discrimination against an entire protected class, often
relying primarily on complicated statistical evidence to establish intent, 128
and occasionally requiring stronger evidence of intent than that required in
an individual case. 12 9 Even when pattern or practice evidence is used in an
individual disparate treatment case, it is not clear that it is being used to
establish employer liability rather than to bolster evidence that a particular
individual acted with discriminatory intent.
In some senses then, the idea of corporate character already has a
theoretical toehold in employment discrimination jurisprudence. However,
a broader conception of corporate character in the individual disparate
treatment context is needed.
B. A Broader Conception of Corporate Intent
The adoption of a broader corporate character theory in employment
discrimination law can have far-reaching implications and may resolve
many of the core problems facing the field.
126. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1273 (11th Cir. 2000) ("[Aln
employer may be found liable [under Title VII] under any one of three discrete theories: pattern and
practice discrimination, disparate treatment discrimination, or disparate impact discrimination. Both
pattern and practice and disparate treatment claims require proof of discriminatory intent; disparate
impact claims do not.") (citations omitted); McClosky v. Prince George's County, Md., No. 95-2913,
1996 WL 726854, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 18, 1996) ("Moreover, pattern and practice evidence has little,
if any, relevance in an individual disparate treatment action such as this one."); United States v. New
York, 631 F. Supp. 2d 419, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("Pattern-or-practice claims differ significantly
from individual disparate treatment claims. In a case involving individual claims of discrimination, the
focus is on the reason(s) for the particular employment decisions at issue. . . . In contrast, the initial
focus in a pattern-or-practice case is not on individual employment decisions but on a pattern of dis-
criminatory decisionmaking.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Courts are beginning
to recognize pattern or practice claims in the harassment context. E.E.O.C. v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg.
of Am., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1059, 1071 (C.D. Ill. 1998).
127. See Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 967 (11th Cir. 2008) ("We
acknowledge that our precedent does not explicitly foreclose plaintiffs' argument; plaintiffs give no
indication, however, of comprehending why private pattern or practice claims for such relief must be
litigated either as class actions or not at all.").
128. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977) (indicating that a
pattern or practice violation occurs where the employer's policies result in a gross statistical disparity
in the success rate of one group as compared to others); Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R.
Co., 267 F.3d 147, 158 n.3 (2d Cir. 2001) (recognizing that pattern or practice claims require proof
of group-wide discrimination).
129. Mister v. 1l. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 832 F.2d 1427, 1434 (7th Cir. 1987) (indicating that the
pattern-or-practice case starts with a stronger showing than that required for individual disparate
treatment).
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The most important change is a shift in the lens through which the
court is asked to view culpable conduct. It might be argued that such a
change is unnecessary because the current disparate treatment law already
holds employers liable for the tangible employment actions taken by su-
pervisors, and that in cases involving tangible employment actions, the end
result will be the same whether conduct is viewed as being directly or in-
directly attributable to the employer. However, relying on indirect liability
necessarily requires the identification of a specific individual or individuals
from whom the company's liability is derivative, and this need affects the
way judges and litigants think about the underlying substantive claim and
the evidence that is admissible to support it.
By focusing on direct liability and characterizing the corporation as an
entity that can possess intent, plaintiffs are no longer reliant on a narrative
of discrimination that relies on a rogue actor. Instead, a wider view of
intentional discrimination can be taken. In some (perhaps many) discrimi-
nation cases, the discriminatory actor is an individual employee. This Ar-
ticle does not argue that such a narrative is always incorrect. Rather, it
argues that overreliance on the idea of discrimination as only occurring
through a rogue actor unnecessarily limits the effectiveness of Title VII. In
at least some instances, the company or a subunit within the company,
through both its formal and informal processes and actions, may be the
culpable actor. It is also possible that the employer and individual actors
both engage in intentional discrimination. The corporate character idea
thus allows for a fuller exposition of potential sources of discrimination
than that posited by indirect liability alone.
A broader conception of corporate intent also impacts the evidence of-
fered to prove such claims, as a corporate entity expresses its intent in
ways that are different than intent expressed by individuals. Current doc-
trine recognizes that companies act through official company policies.
Further consideration of corporate character theory adds a recognition that
employers act and express intent in ways that are not necessarily reflected
in official company policy.130 As one commentator noted:
More often, illegal acts by corporate agents result from de facto il-
legal policies which are communicated indirectly, or from policies
which are not as such illegal, but which a reasonable person would
foresee would lead to violations on the corporation's behalf. A
practice of rewarding or failing to discipline employees found
guilty of past violations, for example, is likely to encourage simi-
lar violations in the future. Inadequate instruction about legal stan-
dards governing employees' day-to-day activities is likely to lead
130. Moore, supra note 6, at 768.
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to violation of those standards. . . . For this reason, the corporate
character theory holds that for a corporation to be culpable, it is
not necessary for it to have formally adopted the policy in ques-
tion, nor is it necessary for the policy itself to be illegal. 13 1
Corporate intent may thus be demonstrated in many ways, including
rewarding or failing to discipline employees found guilty of past viola-
tions, providing inadequate education about expected nondiscriminatory
conduct, repeatedly allowing discrimination to continue, ignoring indica-
tions that systemic discrimination exists, and overrelying on subjective
decisionmaking.
While the actions of individual actors may still play an important role
in establishing liability, the corporate character idea dispenses with the
idea that a single individual or group of individuals must be identified. It
also allows for the broader admission of evidence of actions taken and
comments made by individuals other than the alleged wrongdoer, which
should minimize the effects of the stray remarks doctrine.
Likewise, because the focus is on the liability of the employer, courts
will be encouraged to look more broadly at the workplace. In cases where
a tangible employment action is alleged, all of the decisionmaking that
affected a particular individual or even a job unit may be appropriate evi-
dence of intent, including the decisionmaking processes and the context in
which those processes occurred. Because the focus is not limited to a par-
ticular job decision, courts should be better able to perceive the workplace
as it is, with complicated decisionmaking dynamics, rather than as a series
of isolated decisions made by a single individual. In the harassment con-
text, the concept of corporate character may be used to argue for a broader
view of the workplace environment.
Take for example a case with the following facts. 132 A woman is sex-
ually harassed by a supervisor who tells her that he would rate her per-
formance more highly if she went to a hotel with him. When she com-
plains, the Personnel Manager tells her she is a troublemaker and that the
company does not really need troublemakers. After filing a Charge of Dis-
crimination with the EEOC, the woman is moved to a department where
she no longer works with the supervisor and the Personnel Manager.
The former supervisor is later put in a position where he audits the
woman's work. He falsifies reports about the woman's performance and
131. Id.
132. This fact pattern is based on the underlying facts of Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Co., Inc., 421 F.3d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 2005), as recounted by Professor Tristin Green in her
article Insular Individualism: Employment Discrimination Law After Ledbetter v. Goodyear. See
Green, supra note 75, at 360-62. This Article uses Professor Green's narrative because the facts as
presented by the Supreme Court ignore most of the underlying background. See generally Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
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tells her it is "a lot easier to downgrade you . . . . You're just a little fe-
male and these big old guys, I mean, they're going to beat up on me and
push me around and cuss me."133 He also continues to ask the plaintiff out
on dates. When she refuses, her audit reports get worse.
Later, the woman is selected for a layoff, with the company asserting
that the decision is based on her performance reviews by a different su-
pervisor who was not involved in the earlier events. 134 The woman does
not receive a raise during the year she is slated for layoff. In a subsequent
year, the woman is also denied a raise. The questionable audit reports may
have been relied on by the decisionmaker to deny the plaintiff a raise. The
Personnel Manager to whom the plaintiff complained later becomes her
supervisor. Later, the Plant Manager tells the woman "that [the] plant did
not need women, that [women] didn't help it," and that women "caused
problems. "135
The woman has statistical evidence showing large differences between
her pay and that of men in similar positions, testimony by other women
regarding their discriminatory treatment by the employer, and evidence
that her work performance did not correlate with her pay.
Under this set of facts, the courts are likely to do several things when
deciding whether the two decisions not to give the woman a raise are dis-
criminatory. First, the courts are likely to view the culpable actors as the
supervisor and the Personnel Manager and to separate those individuals'
actions and intentions from the acts of later decisionmakers. 136 Second, the
two pay decisions are likely to be viewed as independent both from each
other and from the other activities happening in the workplace. 137 Like-
wise, the performance reviews by the later supervisors will be considered
independent of and not reliant upon the views of others acting with discri-
minatory motives. 138 Third, at least some of the comments made will be
regarded as stray remarks and as not related directly to the two pay deci-
sions. 139 Finally, each discriminatory action will be treated as a separate
claim, and the court will not consider that the type of discrimination that is
happening cannot be pigeonholed into just two tangible employment ac-
tions. 140
This way of viewing the facts is not surprising if the courts think of
the company's liability as being dependent on the acts and intentions of
individual employees. A corporate character theory of liability changes the
133. Green, supra note 75, at 361.
134. See Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1188.
135. Green, supra note 75, at 361 (citing Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1189 n.27).
136. See, e.g., Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1186-89.
137. See, e.g., id.
138. See, e.g., id.
139. See, e.g., id.
140. See, e.g., id.
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view of the culpable actor from the individuals to the company or to a
particular business unit within a company. This would allow the plaintiff
to argue that the company engaged in intentional discrimination when it
promoted individuals who engaged in harassing and retaliatory behavior,
put those individuals in charge of her performance evaluations without
reviewing whether their past conduct might taint the review process, al-
lowed discriminatory and retaliatory reviews of her performance to infect
the entire compensation and layoff review process, and ignored evidence
that system-wide discrimination existed. While a judge or a jury is not
required to believe this narrative, it is at least one plausible explanation of
what the plaintiff faced.
Recognition of a corporate character doctrine also may be a necessary
innovation for the importation of unconscious discrimination or structural
discrimination theories into court practice. Theories of unconscious or
structural discrimination that rest on direct liability may be more appealing
to courts, because such claims would depend more on the unconscious or
structural discrimination that the employer has allowed to be reflected in
its formal and informal policies, rather than on unconscious discrimination
that may be present in the mind of individuals.
Additionally, the broader account of direct corporate liability may
make courts less likely to try to pigeonhole the plaintiff's cause of action
into a particular framework, excluding evidence of discrimination that
does not fit neatly within that framework. In other words, when the poten-
tial discriminatory actor is the employer and not an individual, courts may
be more willing to consider broader evidence that demonstrates discrimi-
nation.
To borrow from the earlier hypothetical, a court that envisions the
corporation as the wrongful actor may be more willing to consider that the
existence of maternal wall discrimination, complaints about a glass ceiling,
experiences of sexual harassment, and complaints about a lack of client
development opportunities as reflecting a corporate culture of gender dis-
crimination. In contrast, a court that is looking for an individual on whom
to base indirect liability will see different types of discrimination being
perpetrated by different individual actors and will likely try to claim that
some or all of these other activities are irrelevant to another female em-
ployee's claims. When viewing the employer or a particular department as
the appropriate actor, it is easier to see how a general culture of discrimi-
nation would lead to an actionable claim, even though that claim does not
fit nicely within any of the current proof structures.
C. Addressing Potential Problems
Any thorough discussion of a new idea will, of course, attempt to an-
ticipate its problems. In many respects, the application of corporate liabili-
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ty principles in the employment discrimination context raises fewer issues
than their application in the criminal context.
For example, many scholars express concern about whether the retri-
butive purposes of criminal law should be effectuated against corporations,
whose shareholders may be the ones ultimately held financially responsible
for the acts.141 In the civil context, the concept of retribution plays a more
muted role. Further, at least with respect to the federal antidiscrimination
statutes, statutory caps and other limitations severely limit the possibility
of catastrophic losses for shareholders.
Some have argued that corporate criminal liability is simply unneces-
sary, because the deterrence function of such liability is better accom-
plished through the administration of civil penalties. 14 2 Such a critique is
missing in the employment discrimination context, where civil remedies
serve as the primary legal deterrents. Additionally, theoretically, the crim-
inal law may be seen as tied more directly to "human deviance"143 and
based in a more individualistic viewpoint of culpability1 44 than civil liabili-
ty.
Of course, those who maintain a nominalist notion of the corporation
may never believe that it is appropriate to consider a theory of corporate
intention that is separate from those of individuals. However, in the em-
ployment discrimination cases, the Supreme Court has signaled its belief
that corporate and individual intention may be different from one another.
Arguably if Title VII requires intentional conduct, then corporate policy
cases implicitly recognize that the corporation can engage in discrimina-
tion separate from the intent of any particular employee or groups of em-
ployees.
Perhaps the biggest challenge to the importation of corporate character
liability is the argument that such importation is a ruse, intending to do
more than just transform the question of who is intending to act. Rather,
its adoption may change the nature of the intent requirement itself and
hold employers liable for negligence. Indeed, focus on corporate com-
pliance programs to determine corporate character may suggest that such a
theory of direct liability subjects the employer to liability for acts of negli-
gence.
Such a change is not intended or advocated in this Article. As corpo-
rate policy cases suggest, a theory of direct liability need not be based on
141. Friedman, supra note 6, at 853-54 (discussing whether retribution against corporations is
desirable and contrasting with lesser concerns about retribution in civil context).
142. See Khanna, supra note 108, at 365-66 (arguing that corporate criminal liability is often
unnecessary, because the deterrence function can be accomplished through various civil mechanisms).
143. Lederman, supra note 107, at 647; Metzger & Dalton, supra note 6, at 498.
144. See, e.g., Quaid, supra note 111, at 69; see also Bucy, supra note 6, at 1134-36 (discussing




negligence, but rather, can still incorporate an intent standard. Admittedly,
it may be difficult for courts to determine when an employer is acting in-
tentionally and when it is acting negligently. However, in the traditional
torts context, courts have been able to manage the sometimes blurry line
between negligent and intentional acts. While there may be some uncer-
tainty as courts wrestle with how to apply the concept of intent to a corpo-
rate entity, the likely presence of these practical problems does not war-
rant complete rejection of the idea of corporate intent.
Direct liability also may cause courts to posit whether the current con-
ception of intent, which at times appears to focus on animus, is the only
conception of intent that is appropriate to apply in the individual disparate
treatment context. It may invite the courts to consider whether intent is
established if the corporation knew or was substantially certain that dis-
crimination would result from its conduct. While this Article offers a solu-
tion that would work within the current employment discrimination
framework, further exploration of what "intentional" discrimination means
is a likely result of adoption of corporate character theory.
Additionally, corporate character has not yet been widely adopted in
the criminal and/or corporate contexts, and this reality likely means that
the theory will not come fully formed into the employment context. There
are likely to be growing pains as the courts sort out how to best incorpo-
rate the concept of corporate character, both as a matter of law and as a
matter of evidence. 145
CONCLUSION
For the most part, employment discrimination law's concept of corpo-
rate liability has stalled. However, corporate law is developing a rich and
nuanced theoretical basis for expanding corporate liability beyond respon-
deat superior. Incorporating the corporate character idea into the employ-
ment discrimination context could help resolve several of the key concep-
tual problems within the field. This adoption should also lead to a broader
conversation about the concept of intent within employment law.
145. However, such inquiries do not need to be considered in a vacuum. For example, the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines take corporate character into consideration when determining sentences, includ-
ing a review of participation of high-level managerial employees, prior history, and the existence of
corporate compliance programs. Moore, supra note 6, at 786-93 (discussing Federal Sentencing
Guidelines). Others guideposts are provided within the corporate character literature, which advocates
that company structure, Bucy, supra note 6, at 1129-33, and both explicit and implicit company goals
can be used to determine corporate character, id. at 1133-34.
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